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Articles

The Use of Structures in Communication Networks to Track Membership in Terrorist Groups

by H.A. Eiselt and J. Bhadury



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Abstract

This concept paper investigates possibilities to detect terrorist cells based on communications between individuals without the need for wiretapping. The advantages of such procedure are apparent: fewer (if any) legal requirements, and, most importantly, the possibility to automate the surveillance. After a brief review of the pertinent literature, we offer three approaches that are designed to aid in the detection of not only terrorist cells, but also the command structures within the cells. The techniques are demonstrated by using a small illustration. The paper concludes by outlining limitations of the procedures described here.

Key words: Counterterrorism, terrorist cell detection, command structure, graph structures, social network analysis.

1. Introduction

Recent events surrounding Mr. Edward Snowden (Greenwald, 2013) have put some activities of the National Security Agency (NSA) into the limelight and under the microscope. In particular, questions regarding the legality of collecting (and storing indefinitely) a large number of data appear troublesome. One such example is the ruling by the European Court of Justice that mandated Google to remove websites with personal information or links to them if requested by individuals, if warranted (The Times-Picayune, 2014). Furthermore, the potential of such information gathering resulting in a very large number of “false positives” is problematic. This paper attempts to describe automatic approaches that only deal with metadata, thus falling into the category of traffic analysis (a toolkit that originated during World War II; see, e.g., Ressler, 2006), thus limiting invasion of privacy as well as avoiding cumbersome legal requirements (as described in the Sentinel Visualizer, 2013). Traffic analysis has the advantage of not having to deal with translations, steganography, cryptography or similar difficulties. Furthermore, it is able to deal with huge sets of data, leaving only fairly small numbers of individuals who have to be investigated further, a labor-intensive, legally challenging and costly undertaking. In other words, the analyses presented in this paper are of a preparatory nature that filters out many of the connections and individuals, who are most likely not related to acts of terrorism. The underlying assumption here is that once this smaller set of connections and individuals are identified, they will be analyzed using much more in-depth techniques that will require knowledge of content and therefore, legal approval.

As is the case with most (and not just automated) methods, there are possible errors. Erring on the cautious



side, the analyst will be left with many “false positive” leads that require surveillance at great cost. On the other hand, very tight selection rules may allow actual terrorists remain undetected with possibly disastrous results. This clearly calls for fine tuning by knowledgeable analysts.

Any social network analysis that deals with terrorist activities consists of three phases: first, there is the *development phase*, in which a network of relevant individuals is developed. Typically, work in this phase starts with a small number of known or suspected terrorists, and, based on their former or present contacts a “trust network” (Everton, 2012) is grown. The second phase is the *delineation phase*, in which present connections between individuals in the trust network are determined, thus forming operational networks. Furthermore, clusters (cells) and the hierarchy within these cells (if any) are also determined. Finally, phase 3 is the *deletion phase*, in which a plan is drawn up to remove the threat by eliminating individuals in the cell, so as to maximize the (short or long-term) damage done to the terrorist network. It appears reasonable that steps in this phase should preferably wait until a terrorist act appears imminent, as the destruction of even a small part of the network will signal to the terrorists that they have been detected, perhaps necessitating the work of counterterrorist operations to start afresh.

While this paper does not deal with the deletion phase, we offer a few thoughts on the subject since that is generally the step that follows detection. While the elimination of threats attributed to (mostly, but not necessarily, leading) individuals, appears an obvious task, it is interesting to note from the literature that this may actually be counterproductive in some circumstances. For instance, Medina (2012) has demonstrated that his 381-node terror network was surprisingly resilient and did not show any major deterioration after two of the key figures were removed. The author asserts that “Attacks on the network can lead to further decentralization and splintering.” This leads to a general question of the effectiveness of many measures of counterterrorism: if the elimination of top individuals leads to the fragmentation of the movement, as well as its further decentralization and metastasizing (thus the creation of an enemy that is difficult to detect, let alone destroy), would the lack of counterterrorism measures (at least as they do not directly threaten a country’s own population), let the movement morph from a decentralized collection of cells (such as al-Qaeda) into a hierarchically structured organization (such as Hamas) that is potentially easier to deal with? This and similar questions are posed by MacGinty (2010).

Another issue in the deletion phase is dealt with by Xu and Chen (2008). They examine optimal removal strategies in random, small-world, and scale-free networks and confirm Holme *et al.*’s (2002) assertion that small-world networks are more sensitive to attacks on “bridges,” i.e., nodes that are included on many shortest paths, on which communication presumably takes place.

For the most part, this paper deals with the delineation phase. More specifically, we are interested in using social network analysis in order to detect operational networks and, if possible, determine their command structure of a terrorist network or cell.

This paper develops three different techniques that allow to automatically analyze metadata regarding (mostly, but not exclusively, electronic) communications. The first method uses two stages: in the first stage, it employs a static analysis to detect cells, while the second, more complex, stage, it is dynamic in that it provides a way to analyze temporal data in a reasonably compact way so as to determine potential command structures within cells. The second technique describes graph structures, which, if detected in temporal communication networks, may indicate terrorism related activity that warrants closer inspection. Finally, the third approach is also dynamic. It tracks the degree of separation (Milgram, 1967) of suspected individuals over time in a manner that makes evident the potentially emerging leaders.



The limitations of the techniques described in this concept paper are clearly those that are related to the implementation of these techniques. In particular, extensive field tests are required to fine-tune the techniques so as to balance the occurrence of false positives and missed detections. It is also worth re-emphasizing that while we tend to put our discussion in the framework of electronic communications, such as phone, email or social media, the methods described in this work are applicable to all types of communication.

The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a short literature review, while Section 3 introduces static and temporal (dynamic) graphs, how to generate them from communication records, and Section 4 outlines some structures in dynamic graphs and what they tend to symbolize in general and in terrorist networks in particular. The last Section summarizes our analysis and provides some potential extensions of this study.

2. Literature review

As evident from the references, terrorist networks and their detection have received wide attention in the literature. However, most contributions in the literature deal with the deletion stage. As Krebs (2008) put it succinctly: “When activity reaches a certain pattern and threshold, it is time to stop monitoring the network, and time to start removing nodes.” Farley’s (2007) work also deals with ways to optimally render a known terrorist network inoperable, given that not all of its members can be reached, as they may reside in countries or areas the affected state has no jurisdiction over.

In order to determine approximate rankings of individuals in a terrorist cell, a number of measures of centrality have been devised. Starting with the classic work by Freeman (1979), the main measures are the degree centrality of a node, the closeness centrality, and the betweenness centrality as well as the eigenvector centrality. In most of the literature, there is the understanding that a central figure represents an important or powerful individual.

Based on the work of Cook *et al.* (1983), Bonacich (1987) was among the first to disagree with such an assertion. He demonstrates that *centrality* and *power* are two different concepts, emphasizing that power derives from connections to powerless individuals (to paraphrase Caesar, this is akin to being more powerful as the first in a village as opposed to the second in Rome). While this may not always be the case, researchers such as Takkala (2005), and Varden (2011) argue that powerful leaders in terrorist networks (as opposed to the heads of leaders of other organizations or organized crime, e.g., Mafia, Cosa Nostra, Hell’s Angels) tend to be charismatic individuals, since they have to convince other members of the organization to participate in attacks that can be lethal for their own selves, something not likely achieved by force. As Gordijn and Stapel (2008) remark, charismatic leaders with a controversial message are most likely to convince (certain) people to joining their group. Sociologist Max Weber (1922) distinguishes between legal, traditional, and charismatic authority. The leaders who belong to these classes are pragmatic, ideologues, and charismatic leaders. Charismatic leaders tend to be a more of a rare commodity as opposed to technocrats, so that depriving a terrorist cell of its leader is a much harder blow to the organization as opposed to depriving an organized crime organization of their chief. This makes the determination of the position of a member of a terrorist cell valuable information to law enforcement agencies. Furthermore, this argument makes leadership decapitation much more crippling for terrorist networks than for networks of non-terrorist organized crime; see Price (2012). Finally, we mention that a thoughtful analysis of leadership decapitation in the specific case of the *sendero luminoso* in Peru can be found in Oliva (2005) and that the use of theoretical methods such as



partially ordered sets to render terrorist networks nonfunctioning are presented by Farley (2007).

Similarly, individuals in *important* specialist positions, such as bomb makers, encryption specialists, cannot be replaced as easily. Knowledge of the position an individual occupies is central to the decision whether or not to remove him. However, it appears much easier to identify the leader of a cell based on concepts of centrality than specialists, who tend to occupy peripheral staff positions and are not necessarily well connected. Some caution is advised by Kitsak *et al.* (2011), who demonstrate that the best transmitter of information is not necessarily the individual who is best connected.

When terrorists design their networks, theirs is the choice between *efficiency* and *security*. Simply speaking, the most efficient network (as defined by Qiang and Nagurney, 2008, as the inverse of the average length of the shortest path between all pairs in the network) would be a star graph with the leader being at the center of the graph, while all other cell members occupy the leaves of the tree. Such a tree is, however, very vulnerable: the removal of the leader would leave all other nodes disconnected. The fact that terrorist networks avoid such structures and lean, in general, much more towards security, was already voiced by Bin Laden (United States Department of Defense, 2001, quoted via Krebs, 2002b) about the perpetrators of the September 2011 attack, who stated that “Those who were trained to fly didn’t know the others. One group of people did not know the other group.” The emphasis on security in terrorist communication networks has also been pointed out by Morselli *et al.* (2007). For the choice of secrecy over efficiency in non-terrorist criminal networks, see, e.g., Baker and Faulkner (1993), Hutchins and Benham-Hutchins (2010), and Kilberg (2012).

Notwithstanding the discussion presented above about leaders of terrorist networks, some terrorist networks tend to be decentralized; in fact, Sageman (2008) coined the phrase of “leaderless jihad” to describe one such situation. Similarly, Ressler (2006) refers to many terrorist networks as being “loosely connected and adaptive,” while Rodríguez (2007) points out that these networks are constantly changing. In addition, as Medina and Hepner (2008) assert, terrorist cells tend to be self-sufficient as far as most decisions and their financing is concerned. However, as Gunaratna and Oreg (2010) assert, “...a network-based organization remains mostly unsuited for carrying out complex tasks that require communication, cooperation, and mostly significant professional trainings.” In other words, there will have to be some structure with a leader, lieutenants, and foot soldiers in order to organize difficult tasks in secrecy. It is with this in mind we posit that identification of suspicious structures in terrorist networks should be a pertinent tool of detection regardless of the existence or lack thereof of a singular leader; hence the focus of this paper on the same.

As an aside, using the police adage of “follow the money trail” does not appear promising, as terrorist attacks tend to be relatively cheap for the attackers: the United Nations has estimated a price tag of about US\$50,000 for a terrorist attack, while the deadly Madrid bombings were estimated to have cost the attackers a mere US\$10,000 (The Age, 2004).

As Sparrow (1991) remarked, criminal networks tend to be incomplete, have fuzzy boundaries, and are dynamic. And it is this latter feature that we will concentrate on in the remainder of this paper.

3. Analyses of temporal networks

This section will present three distinct models that allow analysts to identify potential terrorist cells or the standing of cell members within a cell given massive amounts of communication data. As alluded to above, the only input that is needed with these techniques are metadata, i.e., the origin of the communication, its destination, the time of its beginning, and the time of its end. The actual content of the communication is not



required in any of these suggested techniques.

The first method starts with a number of network structures that may be expected to indicate the existence of network cells. The second method is a technique that allows the visualization and analysis of temporal data. It avoids the massive sizes of networks that typically arise in these analyses. At first glance, it may appear that both of these models assume that all orders are made by the leader and propagate through all chains of commands until the last of the foot soldiers. In fact, regardless of who originates in order, the implementation of that order is always operationalized by lower-level commanders and foot soldiers. Thus, regardless of whether a global leader or a local superior gives the orders, the propagation of the information generates certain standard patterns/structures within the communication network and the focus of these two models is to detect them, thereby making these models independent of who generates orders in a terrorist network. Finally, the third technique uses static slices of temporal data to show changes of the degree of separation of individual members of a suspected cells and it allows an analysis of their standing within the organization.

3.1. Model 1: Suspicious graph structures in temporal networks

The general approach presented below deals with the identification of graph structures that potentially point to terrorist networks. We first outline a number of basic types of communications and how they would appear in the rooted trees introduced in the previous section. The listing below is by no means comprehensive, the idea is to simply demonstrate certain structures that may be observed. For example, Figure 1 shows unrelated calls between members of the observed set. Concerning the task of identifying terrorist activities, this is essentially noise.




Figure 1

In contrast, Figure 2 shows the typical flow of information in organizations from a superior through the different levels to the foot soldiers




Figure 2



Figure 3 captures the information flow in case of one-to-many reporting, such as an individual in charge of sending out or calling members of a group for a meeting similar to what might be seen in companies, where the information officer sends out mass mailings.




Figure 3

Figure 4 shows a combination of the path in Figure 2 and the one-to-many graph in Figure 3. It is typically for forwarded email messages, such as jokes, Ponzi schemes, etc., which are forwarded from one originator to many recipients.




Figure 4

Consider now the likely communication in security-conscious terrorist cells regardless of the organization, leaders will evolve and chains of command will develop. These are the chains we attempt to find automatically. As alluded to above, there are two types of information flow in an organization, *viz.*, the reporting flow and the flow of orders. There are also flows of general information, which are disseminated by whomever first obtains it. These flows are likely to follow similar paths as the aforementioned flows. Apart from some redundancies, the reporting flow will be a path similar to that in companies as shown in Figure 2. With the command flow, however, the leader will give a command, which is handed down the chain of command, until at some point, it is distributed by some member to the remaining foot soldiers. The shape of such flow is shown as the *broom graph* in Figure 5.




Figure 5

The idea is to detect subgraphs such as these in the dynamic procedure described in the previous section. Given the evidence from existing literature on the average size of terrorist cells, the length of such chains will be somewhere between four and seven or eight nodes. Clearly, such shapes, if they exist in a communication network, will not appear as shown in the Figures above, but will be hidden, i.e., the structures that we are looking for are almost certainly overlaid with noise. The separation of the main structure from the surrounding noise is fairly simple. As any individual arc that enters or leaves a node in the “handle” of the broom in Figure 5 could be communication by or two an unrelated outside source, the best procedure would be one of periodic overlay. In other words, communications can be monitored at multiple times, then overlaid, and only connections above a preset frequency of occurrence are used in the evaluation of the structures.

3.2: Model 2: Studying directed rooted networks

Temporal networks were extensively used by Carley (2003); for a recent discussion, see, e.g., Holme and Saramäki (2012). In our work, we used the main concepts introduced in that work. In order to perform a dynamic analysis on terrorist networks, we adopt a distinction proposed by Everton (2012), who differentiates between “trust networks” and “operational networks.” In this parlance, the network in Figure 6 is a trust network (the 9/11 trust network, first published in Krebs, 2002b, reprinted with permission), while operational networks are those that show communication between members of the trust network (and potentially also communication from/to members of the trust network to/from others on the outside). As an aside, we wish to note that this specific network was constructed in retrospect, after the 9/11 attack; as a result, they were constructed using approaches different than those being outlined in this paper. To reiterate: we assume that a few potential terrorists are known, and their communications are observed and used for analysis.



Figure 6

Since the focus of this paper is the communication between individuals, we will use the term “communication” for observable contacts, such as (directed) email messages, (directed) phone calls, (directed) Facebook contacts, and similar communications as well as non-electronic observations resulting from police work.

For the analysis of the command structure, we suggest a four-step procedure. The first two steps are designed to identify potential terrorist cells. Additional information, including information regarding internal command structures can be obtained by continuing the procedure with the last two steps.



Step 1: Set up the trust network based on prior contacts.

Step 2: Based on the communications between nodes in the network (and possibly to/from nodes beyond), set up a static operational network for the detection of terrorist cells.

Step 3: Given the contact times observed in the metadata of the communication, set up a dynamic operational network.

Step 4: Search for prescribed command structures in dynamic operational network for terrorist cells and command structures.

The usual way to “build” a network is to start with a small number of known terrorists. Given their contacts to individuals outside of the known network (but presumably within their trust network), we can gradually expand the small network by including these contacts as well as the connections between them. This procedure continues for a small number of steps, until a static graph can identify a potential cell.

In order to illustrate the suggested procedure, suppose we have the communications data shown in Table 1. For simplicity, we only consider the origin and destination of a contact as well as the time the call was made. For simplicity, we do not consider the length of the call and the location the calls were made from and to.

Time	Contact from	Contact to
8:01	A	B
8:03	A	C
8:05	D	E
8:06	B	E
8:06	F	A
8:07	E	F
8:09	B	C
8:10	D	C
8:11	A	D

Table 1: Contacts between individuals in our illustration

The first two steps of the procedure result in the usual *static graph*, which ignores the timing of the calls. The static graph for this example is shown in Figure 7.




Figure 7

The interpretation of this network structure is not clear: we discern the circuit $A - D - E - F - A$, as well as the fact that C only receives, but does not send, messages. If the messages concern the flow of information, C may be a leader, whereas in case the messages carry orders, C is either a foot soldier or occupies a specialty function. In order to obtain more information (without attempting to obtain information of the actual contacts), we will have to introduce the timing of the contacts.

First, however, we need to introduce a subtle, yet important distinction. When analyzing the flow of information, it would technically be irrelevant which node initiates a call. For instance, if in the above example node B has a certain information, then the directed call from A to B at 8:01 will result in both, A and B having this information, assuming that node B has actually forwarded it. The situation would be the same if B had initiated the call instead, in which case A and B would also both have this information. In case it is unknown or deemed irrelevant who contacted whom, we refer to *undirected information*. On the other hand, if B has a certain information such as an order or a report, then B will actually initiate the call rather than wait for other to call him. Such *directed information* can indicate the standing of the caller in relation to the called. This is what we analyze below.

In order to do so, we consider each node, one at a time, as the potential source of information & determine which other nodes in N can be reached by the observed contacts. Suppose we start with some node n_i . We then could consider only arcs to nodes $n_j, j \neq i$, if node n_i contacts n_j within a prespecified amount of time, say, Δ .

One possibility here is to consider only arcs, whose origin starts at a time that is not later than Δ (a predefined time frame) than its predecessors. The idea is that an order will be forwarded from one cell member to the next within a fairly short time, especially if it is important. However, if a node made contact with another node within Δ minutes after being contacted by another individual, we will set back the time and allow up to another Δ minutes to make another call. This will permit an individual to transmit a message to multiple recipients. The actual value of Δ will have to be fine-tuned by the analyst, our recommendation being to use a value that is sufficiently large so as not to be restrictive.

We first describe an efficient procedure that determines $|N|$ *temporal graphs* for directed information. In essence, we start with one node at a time, assuming that there is some information (e.g., an order) available



at the beginning of the observation period. We then determine the set of nodes that will have obtained this order at the end of the period. This concept is similar to that of the “information set” in game theory. We refer to the resulting graphs as rooted trees (even though, strictly speaking, they are branchings, as the links are directed).

Procedure for the spread of directed information from a node s

Initialize: All (directed) contacts are listed in chronological order as (i, j) . Define a set I , which is originally set to $I := \{s\}$.

Procedure: While the list is not empty,

do

scan the list from the top until a contact (i, j) with

$i \in I$ if found, insert (i, j) in the graph, set

$I := I \cup \{j\}$ & delete this contact & all entries above it.

end

The computational complexity is linear in the length of the list, i.e., the number of contacts, for each graph. Given p contacts, the complexity of the procedure is then $O(|N|p)$.

The spread of (undirected) information is determined in a similar fashion. We only have to replace “ $i \in I$ ” in the first line of the *do* loop by “ i or $j \in I$.” It is interesting to note that the idea of this procedure is the same used in ego networks described by Liljeros *et al.* (2003) for the spread of sexually transmitted infections.

Given the example in Table 1, the above procedure determines the rooted trees shown in Figures 8a – 8f, given that our observation commences at 8 a.m.




Figure 8



The tree rooted at *A* in Figure 8 has a broken line from node *B* to node *C*, as the message that originated at *A*, was already received by node *C*. The graphs in Figure 8 allow a number of possible conclusions. Among them we have either

- *A* is the leader and nodes *A* through *E* are involved in the cell, or
- *B* is the leader and nodes *A* and *D* are unrelated, or
- *D* is the leader and nodes *A* and *B* are unrelated, or
- *F* is the leader and nodes *B*, *C*, & *E* are unrelated.

Before closing, we should also indicate the sensitivity of the above approach. In order to do so, suppose that we work with the same set of data, but now let our observations commence at 8:06 rather than six minutes earlier. The resulting rooted trees are shown in Figure 9a – 9f.




Figure 9

Note that the conclusions, and particularly the emergence of node *A* as a leader, has changed: at this time, we may conclude that

- either *B* is the leader with nodes *A* and *D* unrelated, or
- *F* is the leader with nodes *B*, *C*, and *E* unrelated.

We hypothesize that the true leader will emerge after repeating this model a few times on the communications between these suspects – either *F* or *B* (or both, if they are heading different parts of a planned operation) will appear as the root of most of these directed trees and can be reasonably assumed to



be the leader.

3.3 Model 3: Changes of the degree of separation over time

Our final approach to detection is based on a dynamic analysis of static communication data in terrorist networks. In order to illustrate the same, recall that from a formal point of view, social networks are represented as a set of nodes $N = \{1, 2, \dots, n\}$ with each node representing one actor (suspected terrorist or other individual), while binary connections are either represented by the set of (undirected) edges $E = \{e_{ij}; i, j \in N\}$ or the set of (directed) arcs $A = \{a_{ij}; i, j \in N\}$. Many of the papers in the open literature (see, e.g., Krebs, 2002, Qin, 2005, Yang, 2006, or Rodriguez, 2007) deal with networks that are based on what the authors refer to as “connections” between the actors. Clearly, such connections can denote a variety of things that should be dealt with differently. Among the most popular networks are Krebs’s 9/11 networks (Krebs, 2002b, reprinted with permission) which are reproduced here in Figures 10a and 10b. While the network in Figure 10a represents the terrorists’ “trusted prior contacts,” i.e., their common experiences and backgrounds (growing up in the same village, attending the same school or mosque, participation in the same flight instruction program—the importance of such factors has been emphasized by Ericson, 1981 and Abrahms, 2008), Figure 10b also includes additional edges that indicate contacts that were made during meetings shortly prior to the 9/11 attacks. While each of the networks is static, the two networks, viewed together, present two slices of a temporal continuum, thus providing a dynamic dimension.

Using Milgram’s (1967) concept of degrees of separation (where we define the degree of separation between two nodes i and j as the number of arcs or edges between them on the shortest path that connects them), we can determine the degrees of separation between each node in the network, one at a time, and all the other nodes. In other words, we can determine how many nodes are within one, two three, etc., steps from each of the given nodes. Similar to the concept of a Lorenz curve (Lorenz, 1905), we can graph the standings of individuals in a cell at two points in time and can record any dramatic changes. For any given node n_i we plot on the abscissa the proportion of the degree of separation (i.e., the length of the shortest path from n_i to other nodes in relation to the longest path from n_i to any other node in the network), while on the ordinate we plot the percentage of degree of coverage, i.e., the proportion of nodes that are within a given number of degrees of separation from n_i . In one extreme case, all nodes are within one degree of separation from n_i , which means that the curve will start at the origin, but then jump up to 100% and stay there. This indicates that the individual that is represented by n_i is very well connected and extremely close to everybody in the group. In the other extreme case, the curve, starting again at the origin, stays on the abscissa until it reaches 100%, at which point it moves up. This indicates a peripheral individual who is very poorly connected to other members of the group. In order to compare the two snapshots, we can—similar to the Gini index (Gini, 1909)—compute the area that measures the differences in the separation for each individual comparing the two snapshots, i.e., the areas between the two curves. Any individual, whose curve has moved dramatically up and to the left (such as that of M. Atta in this example) indicates the emergence of a leader, and also possible signals an impending attack.




Figure 10a




Figure 10b

We have computed this change for three of the members, *viz.*, M. Atta, S. Alghamdi, & H. Alghamdi for both graphs and plotting the results before the meeting as solid lines and those after the meeting as broken lines in Figure 1, it is very much apparent that M. Atta's status had changed a great deal. In particular, he had clearly emerged as a very well connected individual within the observed group—an indication that he might emerge as a leader, which he ultimately did. We posit that by conducting a similar analysis of static communication data, any change of this nature should put up a red flag of detection. As Krebs remarked in Bohannon (2009), Atta's status as the ringleader was apparent by investigating any of the usual graph-theoretical measures. While this is undoubtedly true, a dynamic analysis such as that suggested in this paper, allows counterterrorism officials to see his status emerging over time, thus allowing the possibility of appropriate interventions during this emergence period.




Figure 11

4. Summary, Extensions and Limitations

The contribution of this paper consists of three techniques that can be used to automatically detect potential terrorist cells by using metadata of communications. The dynamic analysis allows not only to detect cells, but also the standings of individuals within the cell, the second technique outlines some of the graph structures that may indicate terrorist activities (a technique that can be coupled with the dynamic analysis presented earlier) while the third method compares two static snapshots taken over time (preferably before and after an important event) and compare these. The results of the latter can indicate emerging leaders or other dramatic changes.

Some extensions of the analysis present themselves. For one, recent events have already caused the “terrorist community” to make some changes. In particular (Fishel, 2013), terrorists have already started to move away from fast, but not secure, electronic communications. Some even have—as Bin Laden before them—started using trusted couriers they know personally (even though, in Bin Laden’s case, this was what ultimately caused his demise). While multimode communication can be incorporated in the framework presented in this paper, it must be automatically observable, which personal courier services are not.

With regards to the limitations of the approaches described in our paper, an important issue is that automatic methods actually identify phone numbers or computers and the people they are registered to, but not the individuals who actually send the message. Even though it is unlikely that terrorists use public computers, e.g., in libraries, this may present a problem. A similar issue occurs with single-use cell phones.

As an aside, another implementation feature of our model arises from the fact that although the models proposed in this paper do not specifically require it, they will work most efficiently in cases where counterterrorism officials have already determined that there is a high probability of the existence of



terrorists and further, that the communication being examined relates primarily to terrorism related activities. While our models will work in all other cases also where this is not true, the collection of metadata from all communication technologies of even one country, or city, may impose an infeasible resource requirement.

There are, of course, problems beyond the detection phase discussed in this contribution. The use of anonymity systems such as TOR (TOR, 2014), the use of coded language, or the employment of different communication methods may obliterate tracks and make detection more difficult. These issues are, however, beyond the scope of this paper.

Finally, as far as network structures are concerned, it can be expected that terrorist organizations, flexible as they are, can and will adapt to counterterrorist measures. One aspect in which they can adapt is to change the structure of the cell networks, so as to minimize the impact of interference from law enforcement. One step into the direction of analyzing different network structures and their performance (albeit from the point of view of counterterrorism authorities) was made by Gutfraind (2010) and, more recently, Krebs (2014).

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Expanding the Paradigm: Countering Violent Extremism in Britain and the Need for a Youth Centric Community Based Approach

by Samuel Tyler Powers



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Abstract

In recent years, both academics and politicians alike have struggled to develop a coherent strategy on how to hone in the threat posed by Islamic extremists at home and abroad. This issue has taken center stage in recent months with the emergence of the Islamic State (IS). This article will explore the UK's experience with trying to contain Islamic extremism, focusing particularly on the role youth development may play in future endeavors.

Keywords: Jihadism, Homegrown Extremism, Islamic State, Prevent Strategy, United Kingdom

Introduction

Following the emergence of the IS menace this year, there has been a groundswell of inquiry to better understand why British nationals would travel to the frontlines of some of the most dangerous places in the world to fight jihad. Unlike the United States, the UK has had a great deal of experience in trying to contain radical elements within its borders to prevent such activity. Revisiting this experience with Islamic extremism is critical to crafting appropriate responses to preventing future radicalization and attacks both at home and abroad.

The Prevent Strategy: Critiques of Government Approaches at Countering Violent Islamic Extremism

Emerging initially in the wake of the 7/7 bombings, the *Prevent* strategy continues to remain Britain's core policy aimed at tackling "the ideological challenge faced from terrorism and aspects of extremism, and the threat faced from those who promote these views." [1] Since its initial implementation, the strategy has been revised various times to adapt to critiques emanating from the Muslim community that the strategy is merely serving as a means to *inter alia* collect intelligence on Muslims. [2] The most recent revisions carried out after a 2011 review expand the aim of the program to "deal more proportionately with all kinds of terrorist threats and concentrate on some aspects of non-violent extremism that create an environment conducive to radicalization." [3] The new strategy also clearly states that support will be cut to those organizations that oppose "fundamental and universal" British values including certain Salafi organizations. [4] While some support such changes, many disagree including Muslim community leaders such as Mohammed Shafiq, and terrorism expert Dr. Robert Lambert, former head of the London Met Police's Muslim Contact Unit (MCU). Both Shafiq and Lambert view such a shift as regressive and damaging to years of work to weed out AQ operatives amidst conservative religious circles including Salafis in the Brixton and Finsbury Park areas. [5] [6] It remains exceedingly difficult to gauge the real success of *Prevent*, as very few effective tools aside from



anecdotal evidence exist to measure ones vulnerability to becoming involved in extremism and the effect certain programs may have at reversing such processes.[7] Organizations including the Youth Justice Board for England and Wales (YJB) have cited the need to provide *Prevent* projects with an evaluation process. According to a report issued by YJB in 2012 it is important to,

Identify those young people who are most susceptible to being radicalized, and having done so, being able to measure effectively the 'distance traveled' in reducing the their vulnerability, and hence, the impact of the interventions to which they have been exposed.[8]

While developments within *Prevent*, such as the *Channel* project have been created to refine the focus of the program to “identify individuals at risk of being drawn into terrorism; assess the nature and extent of that risk; and develop the most appropriate support plan for the individuals concerned,” it is unclear as to whether such programs have actually been successful in deterring extremist ideology.[9] *Channel* is viewed by many as a substantial addition to *Prevent*, as it stresses collaboration with communities in finding early warning signs of those heading down the path towards extremism.[10] A 2011 report released by the Police Science Institute at Cardiff University (UPSI) attests that in the case of the 7/7 attacks such an early intervention system could have prevented the bombers from mobilizing.[11] As of July 2013, of the 2,653 referrals to the program, 67 percent of those taken into *Channel* were Muslim and the majority were youth.[12]

While those including the 7/7 bombers clearly demonstrate a desire to wage violence, it is unclear as to whether the other referrals to *Channel* have fit such a tight model. Skeptics of the *Prevent* strategy, including Dr. Paul Thomas at the University of Huddersfield, argue that it is difficult at best to ascertain whether a youth is vulnerable to extremism. He also posits that such a process is often not linear.[13] In addition, as of 2011, conservative Islamist groups and those practicing Salafism, no longer had the ability to reference youth to the *Channel* program, minimizing the ability of said groups to weed out nefarious actors who have historically threatened their communities.[14]

“Things do Change”: A Case Study of Community Based Projects Aimed at Tackling Religious Extremism

In interviews conducted for this article, the majority of respondents expressed their belief that Muslim communities must play a larger role in weeding out extremists who prey on youth in particular. In investigating the *Prevent* program, I traveled to Halifax, in West Yorkshire, to meet with a Muslim community officer who had received initial monies from *Prevent*'s Pathfinder fund.[15]

Sail Suleman, a Muslim of Pakistani descent, who holds the title of Interfaith Counselor at the Calderdale city council, developed a training program in 2009 know as “Things Do Change,” whose stated goal is to “prevent violent extremism amongst young people and encourage tolerance and community cohesion.”[16] The creation of “Things Do Change” was inspired directly by the 7/7 attacks. Three of the bombers involved in the attacks including Shezad Tanweer, Mohammed Siddique Khan and Hasib Hussain, hailed from West Yorkshire, spawning interest by local government in creating a program to deter Islamic extremist ideology in particular.[17]

“Things do Change” is made up of ten modules, including guided classroom discussion as well as DVD's and posters, all designed to encourage debate amongst a diverse group of individuals aged 11-19.[18] While offering a discussion forum around issues pertaining to religious extremism, the resource pack also asks students to prepare bespoke projects aimed at minimizing the appeal of extremism by increasing knowledge of Britain's multicultural society. Such projects include an exploration of the maxim “Do unto others as you



would have them do unto you,” highlighting that the majority of world religions, possess a similar apothegm, something that most respondents were unaware of.[19]

After establishing a basis of mutual understanding, “Things do Change” begins to discuss more sensitive issues including citizenship, social cohesion, and the impact of the 7/7 bombings. Suleman commented that in discussing more delicate issues, tensions were quick to arise; it was critical to have an individual who understood local needs and community dynamics to guide the debate.[20] In evaluations of *Prevent* conducted by the UPSI for the Association of Police Chief Officers (ACPO) in 2011, harnessing voices with experience in community organizing was sighted as a recommendation for future initiatives.

There is some evidence that the capacity of communities to self-mobilise or engage in co-productive working may be shaped, at least in part, by the presence or otherwise of individuals with professional community organising skills. This would suggest that enlisting such individuals at a local level into the Prevent agenda could be an important objective for the police.[21]

In a more controversial module, students are asked to present a project on the 7/7 attacks from the perspective of the bombers themselves, in order to unpack the motives leading the young men to commit such actions. This component caused an instant stir, leading some of the projects initial supporters, including multiple members of Parliament, to pull their support for the project all together.[22] Others, including Tahir Alam of the Muslim Council of Britain and Jonathan Bartley of the think tank Ekklesia defended this component, viewing it as integral to exploring what leads one down the road to extremism. In a 2009 interview, Bartley stated,

We need a generation that can understand what motivates ,the other‘.. They need to ask what breeds the anger that in turn produces an unaccountable minority willing to use terror tactics.[23]

While containing elements that some may view as controversial, “Things do Change,” addresses a key void highlighted in critiques of other *Prevent* programs such as the lack of bridge building between communities and the need to address enclavisation in immigrant populations. By establishing dialogue across communities, Suleman has been able to initiate a discussion on sensitive topics, such as racism and foreign policy that are often seen as factors fueling extremism. He has also hosted cultural events and interfaith discussions that bring diverse groups to the table, and go well beyond token expressions of solidarity after an incident like a terrorist attack.

Suleman himself places much of the program’s success on the fact that over the years he has developed an organic rapport with the multi-ethnic community in which he is from, thereby becoming a voice for Muslims and successfully bridging the gap between “police, Masjids and the authorities.”[24] While Suleman’s work stems initially from *Prevent* funding, the fact that the project is managed by local actors, knowledgeable with the local milieu, amplifies its impact much more effectively when discussing sensitive subjects such as multiculturalism, democracy, and citizenship.[25]

While audits into the program remain difficult to obtain, a 2009 review of the project by the Calderdale Council Head of Housing and Community Support applauded the project, describing it as,

an excellent tool in taking forward this leadership role and prompting discussion and debate on community cohesion issues which are so vital to the future of society in Britain.[26]

The success of the project is also evident in its wide scale usage across Muslim madrassas and mosques in West Yorkshire. The resource pack has also been purchased by diverse groups including multiethnic schools in Sandwell, Birmingham, and Lancashire and police forces in Greater Manchester, Metropolitan and London



Thames Valley.[27] The department for children, schools and families (DCSF) recommended the pack to teachers as part of its online guidance on how schools can help tackle extremism.[28]

Credibility and Accountability: Re-Evaluating the Role of Government in Supporting CVE Initiatives

Suleman, UPSI, as well as various scholars including Lambert and Weeks attest that in the majority, certain Muslim populations prefer to rely on local means, rather than government, to solve problems within a community.[29] In an interview conducted by Innes Martin at UPSI with a self-proclaimed moderate Muslim, it was made clear that in resolving a problem, he would look first to “family, then the community then the Imam.”[30] This sentiment was echoed by many Muslim professionals interviewed for this article. [31] While such approaches cannot be seen in a vacuum, after conducting over 95 interviews with Muslim community members, UPSI reiterated that

It remains the case that Muslim communities continue to express a preference for using their own informal social control resources to solve a problem when this is (or at least is believed to be) feasible.[32]

It is in this milieu that the importance of credibility becomes a critical component in addressing the issue of extremism amongst youth in particular. While for the most part, perceptions of the police within the Muslim community in the UK remain positive, there is a clear deficit in trust amongst youth.[33] In a project undertaken in 2009, in the London borough of Barnet, young Muslims expressed suspicion, stating that police should “treat people with respect and stop discriminating,” and that they should “promote a greater sense of interaction with the communities...recruit more ethnic minorities into the areas you police, especially more Muslims.”[34] Such attitudes were confirmed by Suleman and Shafiq, as remaining prevalent amongst youth, even amidst improvements in community-police relationships.

According to reports by UPSI, some *Prevent* programs still lack a genuine understanding of community needs leading populations to remain skeptical of CVE work and policing efforts.[35] This suspicion is heightened substantially when an event occurs in which tactical police measures detailed in CONTEST’s *Pursue* strategy, eclipse or fail to engage *Prevent* teams in planned operations. Suleman detailed a case in which a local Imam came to him to express anger that “spies” had been planted by authorities in a local *masjid*. [36] Such occurrences, whether real or unreal, made it hard to reassure the community that police and those involved in *Prevent* were truly invested in helping fight extremism and not just “snooping” on Muslims. [37] UPSI highlighted that in 2010, *Prevent* work ongoing in Birmingham, was brought to a standstill when advanced CCTV and Automatic Number Plate Recognition (ANPR) cameras were installed through an initiative know as Project Champion, that, in reality, was purposed for CT use rather than quotidian criminal surveillance. *Prevent* officers in the field were unaware of such activity taking place and thus, once the story was blown, their relationships with community members were compromised almost instantly. One community member described how such surveillance undermined the efforts of the police by stating, “the relationship between the police and the community was severed, you know there was a void left there, it was like total mistrust.”[38]

While such damage is not entirely irreparable, the incidents detailed above show how critical local voices can be in maintaining the success of CVE initiatives in the long run, particularly in moments of community disenfranchisement. For some scholars, including Arjun Appadurai, the empowerment of local voices takes on an especially critical role in diaspora communities, where mass media has maintained ties with the parent country, but has also created a “disjuncture between spatial and virtual neighborhoods.”[39] This



disconnectedness is evidenced, for example, in older generations of Somali's living in the US, who prefer to maintain ties with their home culture, and stigmatize those who try to integrate into the local milieu.[40]

Enclavisation and Exclusion: What Can Be Learned from Community Projects Not Focused on Religious Extremism?

While trust building and integration of local voices may be something that is best executed from within, there are ways that government and NGO's can help facilitate such a process. As a youth mentor in New York's inner city, I was able to partake in an initiative spearheaded by an organization known as the All Stars Project titled *Operation Conversation: Cops and Kids*, which set forth to "foster positive interactions between the police and inner-city youth." While dealing with a different demographic (most youth involved in the program are black or Latino), such trust building activities could resonate profoundly with a Muslim youth bulge in the UK that remains suspicious of law enforcement officers.

To begin, the founder of the project, Dr. Lenora Fulani, asks police officers and kids to comment on "how they feel about being there with the other and something that they always wanted to get off their chest." [41] *Cops and Kids* then proceeds with a series of workshops that use games, improvisation workshops, and performance arts to directly engage police officers and youth. The project has been so successful, that, as of October 2011, the NYPD incorporated the initiative into its training for all new cadets.[42] While such an initiative will certainly face new challenges in working with a distinctly different demographic in the UK, it could serve as a useful tool in addressing the strained relationship between police and Muslim youth. Although an extensive amount of youth programs exist dealing with crime, research shows that collaboration between the police and youth in the UK in such an intimate fashion has not been explored at the as of yet.

Before concluding this section, it is worth revisiting the issue of enclavisation as an important factor in breeding extremism. While the researcher cannot claim that there is a conclusive link between residing in an ethnically or religiously homogenous neighborhood, and joining an extremist organization, radical preachers, including Abu Hamza al-Masri, have preyed on recent immigrants in particular living in such areas.[43] Imam Khalid Latif, headed Imam of the NYPD and New York University, as well as various other Muslim professionals, reiterated this point and detailed that the issue was most acute in conservative Muslim circles in which young boys often spend time between mosques run by older Imam's unfamiliar with "western society" and nuclear families who lack English language skills.[44] This type of enclavisation is not unique to Muslim communities. Such a disconnect has been blamed for low levels of performance in schools in black and Latino neighborhoods in the United States as well.[45] In exposing homogenous community groups to various faiths and ethnicities as "Things Do Change" has done, levels of understanding amongst youth become intrinsic even while the nuclear family or local community may remain skeptical. Various studies have made clear that such interethnic contact was amongst one of the largest predictors of a youth's positive attitude change.[46]

Before writing this article, the author had undergone extensive experience taking part in inter-faith and inter-ethnic exercises with youth from various communities. One such initiative spearheaded by the New York City branch of a non-profit named Boy's Hope Girls Hope (BGHGNy), was titled "Guess Who's Coming to Dinner," which brings majority black and Latino youth together with professionals from mixed race backgrounds to discuss careers and life choices over a two-hour dinner. While seemingly simple, it was quite noticeable how after participating in the program for a short duration, a teen's attitude was markedly shifted toward a positive embrace of other cultures outside of the milieu with which s/he is familiar. Interest



in engaging in an environment that otherwise would have been unexposed is heightened, and enduring connections are established, according to BHGHNY's CEO, Brad Zervas.[47] In minimizing the narrative of groups like Al Qaeda and IS, which advocate for ethno-religious enclaves to remain homogenous, the impact of such programs should not be discounted.

Conclusions

In summary, we can distill various key take aways from the UK's experience with CVE work since the 7/7 attacks. Firstly, as various successes and failures of *Prevent* projects have shown us, the marginalization of community voices in the decision making process makes long term project sustainability less likely.

Secondly, a lack of transparency and coordination between *Prevent* officials and other CONTEST strands may breach trust, particularly when tactical CT measures are conducted under the guise of other initiatives. This was evidenced by the ultimate failure of Project Champion that eclipsed existing CVE work by prioritizing tactical surveillance measures.

Thirdly, In approaching target communities, it has proven effective, as highlighted by Innes et al to utilize existing community members rather than relying on those who are unaccustomed to local nuances.

"Things Do Change" has shown that throughout the entirety of CVE projects, an interfaith and interethnic component will help to develop a more diverse understanding of a youth's larger surroundings, thereby undermining the voices of extremists trying to polarize communities on religious grounds.

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The Evaluation of the Effectiveness of Counterterrorism Policies on the PKK-inflicted Violence during the Democratization Process of Turkey

by Irfan Ciftci and Sedat Kula



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Abstract

This study tries to explore the relationship between soft-line governmental policy interventions of Turkey and the responses of the PKK (The Kurdistan Workers' Party) by using time series data from 1995 to 2010. The negative binomial specifications for two models, the number of incidents and the number casualties are used. The aggregated impact of soft-line policies on the level of violence is found to be positive and significant. In one hand, Turkey's EU accession process had a decreasing impact on PKK inflicted violence. On the other hand, the Active Repentance Law increased the violence in the short run. It was found that defiance based governmental policy interventions of Turkey had an increasing impact on the PKK-inflicted violence.

Keywords: Kurdish Conflict, The PKK, Counter-terrorism, Violence, Soft-line policies

Introduction

Terrorism is one of the most complex social phenomena in the age of globalization and the September 11 is considered a turning point in the development of counter-terrorism policies throughout the world. Terrorism is defined by The United States Department of Defense as “*the calculated use of unlawful violence or threat of unlawful violence to inculcate fear; intended to coerce or to intimidate governments or societies in the pursuit of goals that are generally political, religious, or ideological.*” (<http://www.terrorism-research.com>).

Separatist terrorism, originate from ethnic conflicts, is one of frequently witnessed terrorist events across the world. The unanticipated increase in the number ethnic terrorist events during the post-cold war period has taken scholars' attention (C.P. Barros, Passos, and Gil-Alana 2006; Carlos Pestana Barros 2003; Enders and Sandler 2000; Kim and Yun 2008; Steinberg 2008; Teymur and Smith 2008; Ünal, 2009) to evaluate the factors behind ethnic conflict. The question of to what extent counterterrorism policies are effective is also tried to be investigated.

The studies on terrorism (i.e., Crenshaw 1999; Eser 2007; Mead 2005; Netanyahu 1995; Ünal 2011; Wilkinson 2011) revealed different policies and intervention strategies used by countries to deal with terrorism. Intervention strategies vary from country to country due to the social, economic, and internal factors, some have hard-line characteristics and some have soft-line.

In terms of Turkey's last 30 years domestic and foreign political agenda, the Kurdish case (some claim problem) undoubtedly is a significant problem that Turkey faces. The major aim of PKK (Kurdistan Worker's Party) is to hinder the integration of the Southeast Anatolia region to the rest of the country. Since 1984,



this violent conflict between two sides results in more than 30,000 death and over 300 billion dollars has been spent to end the problem (Feridun and Shahbaz 2010). This problem not only has negative impact on Turkey's status as a rising regional power, but has also traversed its efforts in the joint process to EU (Birch 2009; Ünal 2011).

Deterrence-based policies, including military actions, severe sanctions and punishments, emergency declaration for specific period of times, and forcing civilians to expel from their living places (Hewitt 1984; Netanyahu 1995), are the most common types of policies that states employ. The fact that many governments' policies, rather than addressing the root causes behind ethnic conflicts occurred in their countries, rely on strict military measures against ethnicity based terrorist groups is not rare (Feridun and Shahbaz 2010).

The application of only deterrence-based policies (Military Sanctions) is not found to be efficient solution to deal with ethnic terrorism. The most important step in the name of solving ethnic-based terrorism is to create policies and interventions that target to eliminate the underlying causes of ethnic conflict (Byman 1998). Findings of many researches (i.e., Lijpart 2004; Vorrath & Krebs 2009; Windsor 2003) in the field revealed that democratic improvements have great importance to find long term solutions to solve ethnic conflicts and to prevent public support for terrorist groups.

In this sense, Turkey has tried to put the social and democratic projects into effect in order to meet the democratic demands of various ethnic groups with the aim of decreasing tensions that exist between ethnic groups in an ethnically divided society (Byman 1998). Prime examples of these initiatives can be seen during the early 2000.

After 2001, Turkey began to enact democratic reforms to meet the EU demands and to stimulate its membership negotiations with the EU. This democratization process also brought about a change in the Turkish state's counterterrorism policies. Thanks to the driving force of the EU, Turkey issued nine democratic reform packages, which led to serious constitutional changes and challenged the basic principles of the Republican regime (Ulusoy, 2010). When we look at the details of these reform packages, we can see that there are several regulations that were intended to eliminate the Kurdish conflict such as the legalizing of the Kurdish language in public, allowing official and private Kurdish TV and radio broadcasting, Kurdish language courses, and releasing from prison four former deputies of the pro-Kurdish Democracy Party (DEP), including Leyla Zana (Dagi, 2006).

At the end of the 2009, the Erdogan government declared that they had launched the initiative popularly known as the "Democratic Opening". However, the democratic opening was later labeled the "Kurdish Opening". According to Ulusoy (2010), this can be explained by two situations arising from interlinked domestic and international factors; first, the AKP's new strategy, which involved incorporating the Kurds by focusing their religious roots and offering them economic carrots, and the normalization of the political and economic situation in the southeast that increased the expectation for solving the Kurdish Issue. Admittedly, this process would require the government's response to Kurdish demands concerning cultural rights, freedom of expression, and governance. Second, international conjecture provided a great opportunity for the AKP to initiate such a difficult process of political transformation. The EU fully supported this democratic initiative, and the positive international environment and the US' declaration of a withdrawal from Iraq created an opportunity for the government to solve the Kurdish Question. According to Barkey, the "Kurdish Opening" is a very serious effort by the government in terms of showing its changing mentality on the Kurdish Issue, whether or not it will succeed. He points out that this effort is also the most coherent and comprehensive attempt ever made in Turkey (Barkey, 2009).



This study tries to explore the relationship between soft-line governmental policy interventions of Turkey and the responses of the PKK (The Kurdistan Workers' Party) in Turkey. For the purpose of the study, the time period between 1995 and 2010 are analyzed. The question of what the impact of such governmental policies on the extent of terrorist groups' attacks during the democratization period in Turkey is tried to be answered.

The Historical Background of the Kurdish Conflict

The Turkish and Kurdish people have been living together for centuries. Both were considered members of the same social community under the Ottoman rule. Since the establishment of the Republic of Turkey, they have kept their status as equal citizens of the state. However despite this shared history, since the 19th century Turkey has faced contentious relationships between the Turks and Kurds, which has given rise to a protracted social conflict, called the "Kurdish Conflict" or "Kurdish Issue".[1]

During the Ottoman Empire in the 15th and 16th centuries, the Ottoman sultans had provided significant autonomy to local Kurdish leaders who demonstrated loyalty to the state (Ergil 2000). This structural situation in the Ottoman Empire did not create tension until the late 19th century, when the concept of "nationalism" arose in the world arena.

At the beginning of the creation of the new republic, Ataturk and other founder elites aimed to unite different ethnic minorities under a common Turkish identity (Kirişçi and Winrow 1997). After the establishment of the new Republic to create a modern and secular state that refused to follow the dynastic and religious affiliations of the Ottoman state structure (Ergil 2000b), a strong emphasis on "secular" values created tension among the Kurds, simply because of their cultural characteristics (Laciner & Bal 2004).

Several Kurds rebellions against the Turkish state were seen from the foundation of Turkey until the death of Ataturk in 1938 (Hannum 1996, 185-186). The most important rebellion at this period was that of Sheikh Said. After his capturing a large part of the eastern Anatolian territory, the rebellion was suppressed by army forces sent by Turkish Government. Rebellion Sheikh Said resulted in execution of him and his army leaders (Entessar 2009).

Ergil (2000b) emphasizes two main reasons behind the development of the Kurdish uprisings after 1930s; first was the legal system of state that disregarded rule of law, social justice, and pluralism, and second reason was the initiatives to deport of Kurdish group from their ancestral lands due to every conflict occurred. After the 1980 military coup, the military administration (1980-1983) again banned the Kurdish language and changed the names of Kurdish towns and villages into Turkish names. Beside this, Kurdish families were forced to give Turkish names to their children.

The Emergence of the PKK

In 1973, the National Liberation Army was established by Abdullah Ocalan and his friends who were students in the Political Science Faculty at Ankara University (Cakar, Cengiz, and Tombul 2011) with the aim of creating an independent Kurdish state in the Anatolia region (Button 1995). With the help of NLA, Abdullah Ocalan got opportunity to consolidate his leadership skill and social network. Therefore, it would be easy to say that NLA was the first step that would take Abdullah Ocalan and his friends to formulate a separatist organization under the name of PKK. In 1978, the PKK was formally established with a notion of Marxist ideology by Abdullah Ocalan as a separatist terrorist organization with 23 of his friends, including some Turks, in Diyarbakir (Kutschera 1999).



From the establishment until now, the PKK has organized eight congresses. In the second congress which was held in Damascus, Syria, in 1982, the PKK decided to begin a violent armed movement against the Turkish state to create an independent Kurdish state (Cakar, Cengiz, and Tombul 2011).

Killing more than a dozen people in 1984 was the first terror attack by the PKK. Even though Turkish army and police seemed to be the main target of the PKK, PKK killed many unarmed civilians in city centers. Interestingly, the majority of these killings were Kurdish civilians. Official records indicate that besides the police and army casualties, 5687 civilians were killed and 4274 civilians were wounded as a result of PKK's attacks between 1984 and 2009 (Ankara Papers 2004).

Kidnapping, assassination, bombing cars, suicide bombing, armed assaults, and attacking civilians and officials including teachers, health officers, police and military forces have been used by the PKK as attack strategies (Roth and Sever 2007).

Ocalan, the PKK leader, was captured by the Turkish Special Forces on February 16, 1999 in Nairobi, Kenya (Cornell 2011; Eser 2007; Sahin 2001). His capture is one of the most important milestones in Turkey's ongoing fight against the PKK. The PKK declared a unilateral and permanent ceasefire after Ocalan's capture within the frame of his manipulation to PKK militants seeking a peaceful solution of the Kurdish Problem. This unilateral and permanent ceasefire, the longest ceasefire which lasted almost 5 years by the PKK in its history, ended with PKK violence in 2004.

Turkey's Counter-Terrorism Policies towards the PKK

After the 1970s, more than hundred terrorist organizations were created in Turkey. Some are left and some are right oriented terrorist organizations. The DHKPC, MLKP, TKP, Turkish Hezbollah, Al-Qaida, TIT, and the PKK are the ones whose activities were predominantly seen (Eser 2007). Turkish State has great amount of experience dealing with these terrorist organizations. Turkey had success to terminate some of these organizations, but failed to deal with PKK case due to the some counterterrorism policies initiated by Turkish Governments and the national and international support given to PKK. Turkey's response to the PKK terrorism has consisted largely of military measures, rather than other social-economic and reconciliation policies (Ünal 2011).

Turkey's 30-years counterterrorism experience has clearly shown that the military options used to solve the PKK problem do not work on their own. 2001 Turkey's democratic reforms enacted in terms of membership negotiations with the EU have changed Turkey's counterterrorism policies. Besides the military measures against the PKK, indirect negotiations with Abdullah Ocalan were initiated in the name of solving problem (Çandar 2011). However, no reconciliation has yet been reached because of his unacceptable demands.

Governmental Policies towards Ethnicity Based Terrorism

Deterrence (Hardline / Repressive) Based Approach

The premise underlying deterrence based policies is best explained within the principles of rational choice theory. The basic idea behind rational choice theory is that of utility principle which argues that individuals strive to accomplish their own self-interests (Cauley and Im 1988; Dugan, Lafree, and Piquero 2005; Enders and Sandler 1993; Ünal 2011). From the terrorism point of view, members of terrorist organizations make a cost benefit analysis and consider the probability of success before they attempt to attack civilians or a state



(Enders and Sandler 1993; Ünal 2011). Therefore, as deterrence based policy, governments are expected either to raise the cost or reduce the benefits of engaging terrorism activities.

This policy approach commonly includes “raising the certainty and severity of the punishment and apprehension by imposing heavier sanctions, increasing logistical complexity for terrorist attacks by tightening security measures in the potential targets, increasing threat of injury and death by conducting military operations” (Ünal 2009, 54–55).

In the PKK case, deterrence based policies including establishing collective punishment, eliminating leadership cadres, putting pressure on terrorism supporting countries, incapacitating terrorists, disintegrating the terrorist group and proclaiming a state of emergency are used as intervention policies by Turkish Governments for a long period of time (Ünal 2011). Even though studies on the effectiveness of hardline policies have produced inconstant results (i.e., Cauley & Im 1988; Dugan et al. 2005; Enders & Sandler 1993, 2000; Eser 2007; Hewitt 1984; Landes 1978; Ünal 2011), Mead (2005) emphasizes that deterrence based policies are the only way to prevent violent incidents both short and long run.

Defiance Based Approach

The basic premise of the Defiance theory (also known as Legitimacy Theory or soft-line approach) is that if policy interventions carried out by governments towards terrorists or their sympathizers are perceived as legitimate and fair by them in ethnically divided society, they are more likely to be effective in reducing violent incidents, especially in a long run (Lum, Kennedy, and Sherley 2006; Sherman 1993; Ünal 2011).

Another argument raised by the advocates of defiance based policies (Crenshaw 1995; Wilkinson 2011) is that hardline counterterrorism policies to combat ethnicity based terrorism have a potential to create of mythologies of martyrdom, to strength group solidarity, and to increase public support for the militants. For the defiance theory, public opinion is the key factor in counterterrorism initiatives because one of the important goals of terrorists groups is to take public support and to be recognized by moderate societal members for their ideological or political goals (Crenshaw 1999; Kim and Yun 2008; Ünal 2011).

In the context of defiance and desistance based governmental policies to eliminate public support for terrorists/militants, democratic, social, and political reforms initiated by governments play vital role. Byman (1998) considers the implementation of democratic reforms or policies as crucial component of defiance based policies for promoting psychological disintegration between militants and sympathizers.

Methodology and Data

Time series analysis was conducted to measure the impacts of defiance and desistance based governmental policies on terrorist activities. Negative Binomial Model Estimation analysis was used in order to estimate the parameters of the model to be used in this study.

Research question of this study is as follows;

What is the impact of defiance-based governmental policies on PKK's activities during the democratization process of Turkey?

The year 1999 was selected as the turning point in terms of Turkish democracy in this study. Considering the democratization process of Turkey after 1995, four important defiance based policies were selected for this research:



D1: The Recognition of the Candidate Status of Turkey for Accession into the European Union (EU)

Turkey's candidate status for full membership was officially recognized by the EU on December 12, 1999, at the Helsinki summit (Keyman 2007). Even though Turkey's journey was not a new phenomenon, because Turkey's official application to be a member of the EU was enacted on 14 April 1987, recognizing the application status of Turkey in 1999 has been accepted as a turning point for purposes of its democratic improvement (Balci 2008; Çarkoğlu and Rubin 2003; Keyman 2007). This is because Turkey initiated nine crucial democratic reforms in order to meet the EU demands at this time. In other words, Turkey's membership to the EU meant improving its stand on human rights, minority rights, social welfare, religious rights, and democratic rights for its citizens, including Kurds, Turks, the Laz, Arabians, Circassians, Greeks and Armenians. Even though the accession process of Turkey into the EU not directly targeted terrorists, it was expected that the reform packages would prevent nationalist Kurds' support to the PKK by meeting the Kurdish people's demands. The democratic reforms were also assumed to result in reducing the PKK initiated violence since they were designed to decrease the political tensions among the Kurds.

D2: The Returning Home Bill (July 2003- Jan 2004)

In order to provide opportunities for the PKK militants to lay down their arms, the Turkish government initiated a number of repentance laws. Within the democratization context, one of the important repentance laws was "The Returning Home Bill" implemented between the years 2003 and 2004 when the unilateral ceasefire by the PKK was in force. This policy was based on encouraging the social integration process and providing amnesty for terrorists who wanted to capitulate by escaping from the PKK and it was implemented for six months during this period.

The Returning Home Bill was expected to result in reducing the PKK initiated violent incidents because it directly targeted terrorists and it was believed it would cause disintegration within the PKK.

D3: The Active Repentance Law (Jun 2005 and after)

The Active Repentance Law was implemented by the Turkish government with the same purpose and scope of the policy of the Returning Home Bill. It was initiated in 2005 and is still in effect. As seen in the Returning Home Bill policy, this intervention includes an amnesty and a reduction in punishment for the terrorists. This policy is still in force. When this policy began, sharp increase on the level of violence by means of incidents and casualties initiated by the PKK was observed in 2005. Then, this trend showed a sharp decrease until 2006.

D4: The Democratic Initiative ("the Kurdish Opening") (Jul 2009 and after)

At the end of 2009, The Turkish government put into effect the 'Democratic Initiative' popularly known as 'the Kurdish Opening' or 'the Democratic Opening'. This initiative was based on efforts to respond effectively to Kurdish demands concerning cultural rights, freedom of expression, and governance. The Kurdish opening initiative is one of the most crucial policy initiatives in the history of the Kurdish conflict in terms of showing the Turkish State's changing mentality regarding the Kurdish Issue (Barkey 2009). A prime examples of democratic reforms implemented the Turkish government are allowing free speech and singing in the Kurdish language in public, the opening of private Kurdish language courses, and the allowance of TV and radio broadcasting in Kurdish. According to Barkey, the "Kurdish Opening" is the most coherent and



comprehensive attempt ever made in Turkey (Barkey 2009).

The Turkish government expectations has two fold; First, it was expected to reduce the PKK initiated violent incidents in a long run since the Turkish government had met some of the democratic demands of the Kurds. In other words, preventing public support for the terrorists was expected to result in a reduction of violent PKK incidents (Ünal 2011). Second, in the short run, this policy was expected to diminish existing tensions among the Kurds against the Turkish state, and reduce the Kurds' support for the terrorists.

The common point of these interventions is that these are defiance-based policies implemented by the Turkish Government to solve the existing problem to some extent.

Since selected policies are grievance-oriented, their purpose is to diminish these grievances by meeting certain demands concerning the Kurdish conflicts. Therefore, these interventions directly target the Kurdish people and sympathizers of the terrorist organization of the PKK, not the terrorists. These policies aim to reduce public support for the terrorists, which is the most crucial point in the fight against ethnicity based terrorist organizations. In this regard, these defiance-based policies are expected to result in reduced levels of violent attacks initiated by the PKK.

In contrast to these assumptions, some scholars argue that the transition period increases ethnicity-based terrorist attacks since it provides an opportunity for intensifying ethnic grievances in the short run. Terrorist group try to obstruct the democratic reforms initiated during transition periods. These democratic reforms might be perceived as sign of weakness by the terrorist organizations (Rustow 1970; Hewitt 1984; Horowitz 1985; Wilkinson 2011). Democratic initiatives have clearly shown that the PKK benefits from the deadlocks of the Kurdish question, and abuses the Kurds' demands for its political aims, but it does not want to lose its power in the region including Syria, Iran, and Iraq. Given these considerations, following hypotheses were formulated.

H1: The defiance-based policies implemented by Turkey would increase the number of incidents inflicted by the PKK during the democratization period in Turkey.

H2: The defiance-based policies implemented by Turkey would increase the number of casualties inflicted by the PKK during the democratization period in Turkey.

The Dataset was mainly drawn from the Global Terrorism Database (GTD), which is run by the University of Maryland. The GTD is an open-source database including information on terrorist events around the world from 1970 through 2010.

All recorded violent terrorist events (incidents and casualties) committed by the PKK between January 1, 1995 and December 31, 2010 were used.

In addition to the GTD resources, unemployment rate, the number of police operations against PKK, the number of surrenders, the number of terrorists captured by the security forces, the long term ceasefire of PKK, and the capture of PKK leader were used as control variables for this study. These control data mainly collected from police units and statistical offices by visiting the Main HQ of those institutions.

The unemployment rate refers to the percentage of people who were unemployed and looking for a job at the national level during the selected time period of the study. The number of operations refers to the frequency of operations carried by security forces towards the PKK during the considered time period. Another control variable, the number of captured terrorist is the number of terrorists captured by the security forces in Turkey during the time period selected for this study. The number of surrenders refers to the total number of terrorists who were voluntarily capitulated from the PKK over the time period of the study. Control variable



of group size is the yearly aggregated number of estimated group sizes of the PKK in Turkey, Iraq, Syria and Iran during the selected time period.

The Capture of the PKK Leader, Abdullah Ocalan is also selected as control variable since the capture of the PKK's leader, Abdullah Ocalan was one of the most important milestones in Turkey's ongoing fight against the PKK. The impact of seasonality was also taken into account, since it affects the numbers of casualties caused by the PKK, considering the weather and geographic conditions of Turkey. The number of casualties reached its maximum value during the summer seasons (Jul-Aug-Sept), a sharp decline was observed in the winter seasons.

The following table (Table 1) illustrates the characteristics of the study variables.

Table 1: Variables of the Study

Variable	Description		Source	Design	Code
Frequency of incidents (INC)	DV	Count	GTD Database	Aggregated number of violent incidents by the PKK for each month	$Y_{1,T}$
Frequency of casualties (CASUAL)	DV	Count	GTD Database	Aggregated number of violent incidents by the PKK for each month that results in at least 1 casualty	$Y_{2,T}$
The recognizing of candidate status of Turkey for membership to the EU (D 1)	IV	Binary	Literature	0 < December 1999 1 ≥ December 1999	$D_{1,T}$
The Returning Home Bill (D 2)	IV	Binary	Literature	0 < August 2003, 1 between Aug. 2003 and Jan. 2004. And 0 > Jan. 2004	$D_{2,T}$
The Active Repentance Law (D 3)	IV	Binary	Literature	0 < Jun 2005 1 ≥ Jun 2005	$D_{3,T}$
The Democratic Initiative ("the Kurdish Opening") (D 4)	IV	Binary	Literature	0 < July 2009 1 ≥ July 2009	$D_{4,T}$
The Capture of the PKK leader (ACTION)	CV	Binary	Literature	0 < February 1999 1 ≥ February 1999	$C_{1,T}$
Unemployment Rate (UNEMP)	CV	Continues	Turkish Statistic Institution	Monthly unemployment rate starting with the first month=1	$C_{2,T}$
The Number of Surrenders (SURREND)	CV	Count	Turkish National Police	Aggregated number of those who surrender voluntarily and leave the PKK in each month	$C_{4,T}$
The Number of Operations (OPERAT)	CV	Count	Turkish National Police	Aggregated number of operations initiated by the security forces against the PKK in each month	$C_{5,T}$
The number of captured terrorists (CAPTURED)	CV	Count	Turkish National Police	Aggregated number of captured terrorists who were killed, wounded, or alive) per month	$C_{6,T}$



The Group Size (SIZE)	CV	Count	Turkish National Police	Aggregated number of estimated group sizes in each year	$C_{7,T}$
Seasonality (SEAS)	CV	Count	GTD Database	The aggregated number of incidents per month	$C_{8,T}$

Data Analysis

In the present study, the following models were developed to test the impact of governmental policy interventions on the number of incidents and casualties inflicted by the PKK. For general explanations, the terms $\varepsilon_{1,t}$ and $\varepsilon_{2,t}$ represent error terms and followed white noise processes with a zero mean and a constant variance ($0, \sigma^2$). c_k 's represented the constant terms and S_k represented seasonal dummies if these were statistically significant. While $Y_{1,T}$ refers to the frequency of incidents committed by the PKK in the Model 1 (Incidents), $Y_{2,T}$ refers to the frequency of casualties in the Model 2 (Casualties).

$$Y_{1,T} = c_1 + \sum_{k=1}^{12} S_k + \beta_1 D_{1,T} + \beta_2 (D_{2,T} + D_{3,T} + D_{4,T}) + \beta_3 D_{2,T} + \beta_4 D_{3,T} + \beta_5 D_{4,T} + \sum_{j=1}^7 \alpha_{1,T,j} C_{j,T} + \varepsilon_{1,T} \quad (1)$$

$$Y_{2,T} = c_2 + \sum_{k=1}^{12} S_k + \beta_6 D_{1,T} + \beta_7 (D_{2,T} + D_{3,T} + D_{4,T}) + \beta_8 D_{2,T} + \beta_9 D_{3,T} + \beta_{10} D_{4,T} + \sum_{j=1}^7 \alpha_{2,T,j} C_{j,T} + \varepsilon_{2,T} \quad (2)$$

The effect of $D_{1,T}$ was measured separately, because this effect was not only about the PKK, but also about the whole country's situation. On the other hand; $D_{2,T}$, $D_{3,T}$ and $D_{4,T}$ interventions were used both aggregated and individually oriented.

Findings

The following table (Table 2) reveals the Negative Binominal results regarding the individual and aggregated impact of Turkish governmental interventions on the level of violent incidents inflicted by the PKK.



Table 2: Negative Binomial Model Results for PKK initiated Incidents

Variable	Coefficient	Std. Error	z-Statistic	Prob.
C	-2.65	1.10	-2.42	0.02
@SEAS(1)	-0.91	0.43	-2.11	0.04
@SEAS(2)	-33.51	0.42	-80.00	0.00
@SEAS(4)	-0.79	0.27	-2.80	0.01
@SEAS(7)	0.57	0.32	1.79	0.07
@SEAS(12)	-0.91	0.34	-2.62	0.01
D1	-2.35	0.55	-4.27	0.00
D2	0.30	0.75	0.39	0.69
D3	1.29	0.42	3.09	0.00
D4	0.33	0.55	0.60	0.55
D2+D3+D4	0.91	0.27	3.37	0.00
CAPTURED	-0.01	0.01	-1.27	0.20
OPERAT	0.04	0.02	2.57	0.81
SIZE	0.01	0.00	3.11	0.00
SURREND	0.00	0.01	-0.11	0.92
UNEMP	-0.04	0.08	-0.57	0.57
ACTION	1.62	0.57	2.82	0.00
Akaike Info Criterion		2.55		
Log Likelihood		-234.04		
Likelihood Ratio Statistic		91.88		
Prob (LR Statistic)		0.00		

As plotted in Table 2, D3, the Active Repentance Law, which has been perceived as an amnesty, had a positive and statistically significant impact on the level of incidents carried out by the PKK at a 95% confidence level during its implementation period (2005-2010).

The effect of D2, the impact of the Returning Home Bill Policy, which was an amnesty targeting the PKK militants, and the effect of D4, the impact of the Democratic Initiative policy were found to be statistically insignificant even if the directions are in the anticipated way. Their p values are 0.69 and 0.55 respectively, which might be considered practical significant.

According to the table 2, Variable D1 has a negative and statistically significant effect on incidents at a 95% confidence level. This indicates that the accession process of Turkey to the European Union had a mitigating effect on the PKK initiated incidents.

Table 2 also reveals that incidents rarely occurred in the winters, while they mostly occurred in the summers.

The aggregated effect of governmental interventions (D2+D3+D4) on the number of incidents initiated by the PKK was found to be positive and statistically significant at a 95% confidence level. Considering the cumulative impact of these policies, this result clearly indicates that the defiance-based governmental interventions implemented by the Turkish state had an increasing effect rather than a decreasing or neutral



effect on PKK-initiated incidents, contrary to the Turkish government's expectations.

As related to the effects of the control variables on the number of incidents inflicted by the PKK, the effects of the capture of the PKK leader, and the aggregated number of estimated group sizes in each year were found to be statistically significant. These results reveal that capturing PKK leader had an increasing effect on the level of violent incidents, and as the group size of PKK increases, the number of incidents also increase.

The number of captured terrorists was found to have negative and significant effect on the number of PKK inflicted incidents, which means that the more the security forces capture PKK members, the less the number of incidents PKK initiated.

The Negative Binomial results regarding the individual and aggregated impact of Turkish governmental interventions on the level of casualties by the PKK are plotted in the following table (Table 3).

Table 3: Negative Binomial Model Results for PKK initiated Casualties

Dependent Variable: CASUAL					
Method: Maximum Likelihood - Negative Binomial Count Data Model					
Included observations: 192					
Huber/White robust standard errors & covariance are used					
Variable	Coefficient	Std. Error	z-Statistic	Prob.	
C	-1.76	1.38	-1.28	0.20	
@SEAS(2)	-125.23	0.44	-284.61	0.00	
@SEAS(4)	-0.9	0.37	-2.43	0.01	
@SEAS(7)	1.57	0.52	3.02	0.00	
@SEAS(12)	-1.08	0.5	-2.16	0.03	
D1	-2.88	0.49	-5.88	0.00	
D2	0.06	0.09	0.67	0.56	
D3	0.64	0.12	5.33	0.00	
D4	0.32	0.13	2.46	0.01	
D2+D3+D4	1.12	0.33	3.39	0.00	
ACTION	1.72	0.55	3.13	0.00	
OPERAT	0.032	0.02	1.40	0.19	
CAPTURED	-0.019	0.017	-1.14	0.55	
UNEMP	-0.09	0.18	-0.50	0.50	
SIZE	0.01	0.00	2.82	0.00	
Akaike Info Criterion		5.76			
Log Likelihood		-535.02			
Likelihood Ratio Statistic		370.81			
Prob(LR Statistic)		0.00			

Table 3 reveals that the Active Repentance Law (D3) and the Democratic Initiative Policy (D4) had a positive and statistically significant impact on the level of casualties initiated by the PKK.

The effects of the accession process of Turkey to the European Union on the number of casualties by PKK was found to be significant and in a negative direction. The accession process to the European Union (D1) had a negative and statistically significant effect on casualties at the 95% confidence level. This shows had a significantly mitigating effect on casualties.

Although it was in the anticipated direction, the effect of the Returning Home Bill (D2) on the number of



casualties inflicted by the PKK was found to be insignificant.

The aggregated impact of defiance-based governmental policies of Turkey (D2+D3+D4) was found to be positive and significant at the determined confidence level.

As related to the effects of the control variables on the number of casualties, table 3 reveals that the number of operations initiated by the security forces, the capture of the PKK leader, and the aggregated number of estimated group sizes in each year had an increasing and significant effect on casualties at a 95% confidence level.

Following Table (Table 4) reveals the hypothesis results of the study.

Table 4: Hypotheses Results

HYPOTHESES	RESULTS	REMARKS
H1: The defiance-based policies implemented by Turkey would increase the number of incidents inflicted by the PKK during the democratization period in Turkey.		
<i>D1: The Recognition of the Candidate Status of Turkey for Accession into the European Union (EU)</i>	NOT SUPPORTED	
<i>D2: The Returning Home Bill (July 2003- Jan 2004)</i>	NOT SUPPORTED	P = 0.69 (P S*)
<i>D3: The Active Repentance Law (Jun 2005 and after)</i>	SUPPORTED	
<i>D4: The Democratic Initiative ("the Kurdish Opening") (Jul 2009 and after)</i>	NOT SUPPORTED	P = 0.55 (P S)
<i>The Aggregated Impact of DR, D3, D4</i>	SUPPORTED	
H2: The defiance-based policies implemented by Turkey would increase the number of casualties inflicted by the PKK during the democratization period in Turkey.		
<i>D1: The Recognition of the Candidate Status of Turkey for Accession into the European Union (EU)</i>	NOT SUPPORTED	
<i>D2: The Returning Home Bill (July 2003- Jan 2004)</i>	NOT SUPPORTED	P = 0.56 (P S)
<i>D3: The Active Repentance Law (Jun 2005 and after)</i>	SUPPORTED	
<i>D4: The Democratic Initiative ("the Kurdish Opening") (Jul 2009 and after)</i>	SUPPORTED	
<i>The Aggregated Impact of DR, D3, D4</i>	SUPPORTED	

*P S: Practical Significance

Discussion and Conclusion

In the present study, the impact of defiance/soft-line based Turkish governmental policies on the rates of terrorist attacks in the cases of the PKK over selected time period was evaluated. According to the Negative



Binomial Models' estimation results, the study found that the soft-line policies enacted by the Turkish government had a significant and positive effect on the level of violence (incidents/casualties) inflicted by the PKK during the democratization process of Turkey. This finding was in contrast to the expectations of the Turkish governments.

The findings of the NB Models as regards casualties and incidents demonstrated that there was a positive and statistically significant relationship between the defiance based governmental policies and the level of violence initiated by the ethnically motivated terrorist groups. Even though the selected policy interventions were expected to reduce the level of violence (incidents and casualties), the increasing trend of both incidents and casualties as a response to those policies may be interpreted from four perspectives.

First, as discussed in the literature review section of this study, in order to capture the attention of society and seek more support, groups used terror as a tool. Thus, terrorist groups may respond to cultural and social reforms with increasing violence (Crenshaw 1995). Some terrorist groups, especially ethnically motivated groups, as observed this study, may perceive such policies as a sign of weakness, and a compromise on one of their demands, and may see it as a victory based on their increasing violence (Ünal 2011). In this sense, it may be said that one of the important reasons for increasing the level of violence by the PKK during the democratization period was to obtain more concessions from the Turkish government.

Second, the democratic initiatives and reforms toward removing ethnic grievances involved defiance and desistance based policy as mentioned in earlier. Therefore, their expected impact on the level violence may take longer than expected since they targeted grievances in the society to reduce their support for terrorist groups rather than targeting the militants. However, with respect to the NB estimation results, from the increasing trend of the level of violent incidents in response to such social policies it may be inferred that the PKK responded violently to the constitutional and democratic reforms to prevent their probable immediate impact on the Kurdish community by indicating that they were still powerful actors in solving the Kurdish problem.

Third, according to Crenshaw's (1988) organizational approach, the targets of terrorism are symbolically related to the organization's ideological beliefs. Violence is thus the intentionally adopted choice of the terrorist group and explains the result of the organization's struggle for survival. The organization's leader offers many incentives to the followers to guarantee organizational maintenance (Crenshaw 1988). Therefore, some terrorist groups can obtain more benefits from illegal activities such as drug trafficking, weapon and human smuggling beside terrorism as mostly seen in the PKK case (Laciner 2008; Radu 2006; Sahin 2001; Steinberg 2008; Ward and Hill 2002). In addition, terrorist groups enjoy international and regional support (Martin 2012), which may make those groups key players in the country or region. Therefore, with respect to the NB estimation results, one of the reasons for the increasing level of violence during the intervention period may have been that the terrorist group, the PKK, was not willing to lose its gains obtained from their illegal activities and being seen as a regional actor.

Lastly, considering the targeted population of the amnesty policies (D2 and D3), the government targeted those militants who were not involved in any armed battle with the security forces or had not killed any citizen directly. Therefore, regarding the reasons for failure of these amnesty policies one may say that since the terrorist groups have a highly hierarchical structure, the counter strategies taken by the leadership cadre against these policies impaired the success of these laws. For this reason, the Active Repentance Bill (D3) of Turkey produced an increase of PKK initiated violence during the period when these policies were in force. Even though all the reasons mentioned above have attempted to explain why the PKK increased its attacks



during democratization period, it should not be ignored that there is no one simple answer to explaining this process, and each alternative approach should be evaluated simultaneously with the other.

As mentioned earlier, fighting with ethnically-based terrorism is harder to quell than politically motivated terrorism because ethnically motivated terrorist groups have an opportunity to extract broader support from the population. Therefore, it is not as easy to stop or reduce this form of violence compared to other types of terrorism. It is really difficult to isolate regular civilians or sympathizers from the core violent group. Thus, countries struggling with ethnicity-based terrorism should focus more on its causes and employ soft-line policies to counter the grievances in a social context in order to arrive at a permanent solution. And these governmental policies must target the supporters or sympathizers of the terrorist group rather than focusing solely on incapacitating terrorists.

From the findings of this study, we suggest that since the PKK exploits democratic and social reforms such as constitutional and legal amendments, the “Kurdish Opening”, the PKK violence has increased in order to eliminate the effectiveness of these reforms regarding Kurdish community. In contrast, the Kurdish people are pleased with those reforms and wants Turkey to take further actions. Therefore, even if PKK violence increases to sabotage the current process, Turkey’s democratization process should not be terminated.

Eventually, many ethnic conflicts in the world demonstrate that a resolution for solving these problems may be possible as in the examples of countries such as Spain, the UK, and Belgium which have well-established democracies rather than antidemocratic countries or less functional democracies such as the Sudan, Iraq, India, Georgia, and China. Thus, countries should continue to consolidate their process towards democracy in order to provide a permanent solution for solving their ongoing ethnic conflicts despite the fact that the violent groups may increase their attacks against the state and civilians. While the country is fighting terrorist groups within its territory on one hand, it should not neglect to implement democratic reforms meeting all citizens’ democratic demands, on the other. The states thus may solve their protracted ethnic conflicts in the long run. Therefore, the Turkish state should also continue its democratic reforms regardless of the methods used by the PKK.

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Notes

[1] Kurdish conflict is also known as Kurdish Issue or Kurdish Question; therefore these terms will be used interchangeable throughout the study.



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Commentary

Changing The Rules of War:

The Controversies Surrounding the United States' Expanded Use of Drones

by Emanuel Boussios



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The Obama administration has an opportunity, and some would say an obligation, to create a doctrine that sets guidelines for the development and deployment of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), also known as drones. There are a number of debates surrounding the use of drones, the most contentious of which have been as to whether governments have *legal authorization* to do so, and of how *combatant status* is defined under current international law. In Obama's first term, his administration worked to rollback the world's arsenal of nuclear weapons. His efforts and vision of a world without nuclear weapons was one of the reasons why President Obama was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize—inclusive, of course, of his efforts to strengthen international diplomacy. Yet, during this same period, his administration has developed and utilized revolutionary military technologies that may well become signature weapons of the 21st century. Since 9/11, there has been an alarming increase in the use of drones.

Drones generally fall into two categories: those that are used for reconnaissance and surveillance purposes, and those that are armed with weapons for military purposes. The use of drones has grown enormously in recent years, in part, because unlike manned aircraft they can fly long missions. For example, a British drone, Zephyr, can fly non-stop for over 82 hours, are less costly, and have no (immediate) military casualties. Although the cost per flight hour varies by drone type, Predator and Reaper drones cost about \$2,500-3,500 per flight hour, while larger armed systems such as the Global Hawk drone cost about 10 times as much (Southworth, 2013). As of November 2013, 87 nations possess some form of drones and conduct various kinds of surveillance either over their own territories or beyond (Taylor, 2013). Given the extraordinary demand for UAVs, hundreds of companies are currently developing small and large scale drone technology. According to the Teal Group, global spending is set to nearly double from \$6 billion in 2013 to 11.6 billion in 2023. This raises a serious question: What happens when an overwhelming majority of nations have drones? The United States, in conjunction with the international community, may benefit from recognizing this dangerous trend and helping reconstruct international laws to more effectively deal with the use of drones. Restricting the use of drones worldwide will likely reduce future conflicts. An example of such a conflict is the Japanese government's anger over a (suspected) Chinese drone 'violating' the airspace over a small island chain controlled by Tokyo that is at the center of a bitter territorial dispute with China.

The United States has been a leader in driving the UAV revolution and its use in the field. According to recent reports, the US Department of Defense now has well over 7,000 aerial drones, compared with just 50 a decade ago. The fiscal year 2012 budget included \$5 billion for drone research and development (Southworth, 2013). In 2012, the U.S. Air Force trained more UAV pilots than jet pilots for the first time in history. Despite cuts in defense spending, the fiscal year 2014 budget totaled \$4.1 billion for all unmanned systems (Osborne, 2014). This increase in expenditure has played itself out in the battlefield. President Obama has ordered seven



times more drone strikes than his predecessor President Bush in the covert conflicts in Pakistan and Yemen, according to independent estimates (Jackson, 2013). While the British and US Reaper and Predator drones are physically in Afghanistan, control is via satellite from a US Air Force base outside Las Vegas, Nevada. This is likely to be a game changer. The use of this type of weaponry and technology allows the point of critical human decision making to move physically *off* the battlefield and also, increasingly, chronologically away from the time of kinetic action. Of critical concern is the extent to which operators become ‘trigger happy’ with remote controlled armaments, situated as they are in complete safety, distant from the conflict zone. Perhaps as warmaking becomes safer (with the removal of soldiers from the actual horrors of war) and mobilization less difficult, there is a very real danger of losing the deterrent that such horrors provide. Several critics (Chow, 2013), however, have indicated that perhaps this danger is indeed overblown. A study of Air Force personnel found that 17 percent of Predator or Reaper drone operators, and 25 percent of Global Hawk operators, show signs of what the Air Force terms “clinical distress,” which includes depression, anxiety and other symptoms that interfere with job performance or disrupt family life. For comparison, approximately 28 percent of U.S. soldiers returning from Iraq are diagnosed with clinical distress, according to the Air Force (Chow, 2013). For these operators the reality is that the precision and accuracy of these drone attacks are as good as the intelligence on the ground with proper communication. Many operators have seen close-up video of what the military calls “collateral damage,” casualties involving women, children or other civilians that is unnerving and unsettling to them contributing to this combat stress (Khan, 2011). As one drone operator had put it, “We always wonder if we killed the right people, if we endangered the wrong people, if we destroyed an innocent civilian’s life all because of a bad image or angle (Linebaugh, 2013).” Even if the end result appears to be successful, it leaves a hint of doubt as to how accurate their confirmation of weapons and hostile individuals were.

While armed drones were first used in the Balkans war, their use has dramatically escalated since that time. More specifically drones have been used regularly in Afghanistan (recently in Iraq and Libya), in the ‘undeclared war’ in Pakistan, and Somalia (in 2011, US armed drones began operating in the failed state). In October 2013, a U.S. drone strike in Somalia killed two terrorists of the al Qaeda-affiliated group al Shabaab. In another U.S. drone strike in Somalia, a key leader of the al Shabaab group, Ahmed Abdi Godane, was killed in September 2014. This has been part of a greater international response in the sub-Saharan region. The deployment of French surveillance drones in Mali was reported in October (2012) (Cole, 2013). [In the military intervention in Libya—US drone strikes were credited for ending the exile of former Libyan President Muammar Gaddafi.] The Bureau of Investigative Journalism has obtained 2012 data from the US Armed Forces, NATO and the UK’s Ministry of Defence and reveals, for example, that more than a quarter of all armed Coalition air sorties in Afghanistan were carried out by drones (Ross and Woods, 2012). In a 21-page report, the UN special rapporteur on human rights, Ben Emmerson, records a dramatic reduction in drone strikes in 2013 in Pakistan (in response to Pakistani government pressure) but increases in Afghanistan and, towards the end of the year, in Yemen (Ross and Sterle, 2014).

There is also a substantial debate taking place over the issue of *combatant status*, of which targeted assassinations of suspected ‘combatants’ test the legal limits of the Obama administration’s power. While the U.S. government maintains that drone strikes have undermined the Al-Qaeda leadership, critics have argued whether or not the strikes are compatible with the principle of distinction under international law. According to Article 48 of the Protocol Additional to the Geneva Convention (AP I, 1977), “In order to ensure respect for an protection of the civilian population and civilian objects, the Parties to the conflict shall at all times distinguish between the civilian population and combatants and between civilian objects and military



objectives and accordingly shall direct their operations only against military objectives.” (Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck, 2005) For example, in September 2011 Anwar al-Awlaki—a US citizen accused of being the organizational leader of al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula— was killed by a US drone strike in Yemen. The UN Charter, and numerous international treaties, prohibits carrying out the targeted killing of individuals on foreign soil outside of armed conflict, except in extraordinary circumstances. Generally such extraordinary circumstances are understood to involve imminent threats of physical violence, where no other alternative exists but to employ lethal force. The controversy stems from whether the Yemeni government, Yemen is a critical U.S. ally, had officially supported this action *or* did the U.S. in fact violate its airspace to kill a suspected *combatant*. Of further importance is this critical question: what is more dangerous, al Qaeda’s vows to retaliate or the reaction of the Yemeni people to the US’s violation of their country’s airspace and to the murder of a man many of them considered their own (despite his US citizenship)? Although drone strikes give the appearance of toughness and have enormous short-term benefits, their damages to political alliances over the *long term* are of great concern.

Where drone use is *legally authorized* is dependent on location and purpose. In specific ‘declared’ combat zones (i.e. Afghanistan) drone use has *clear rules of engagement*. According to the UN Charter, countries can use force for self-defense. Since the U.S. had solid international legal footing for attacking Afghanistan after 9/11 in self-defense, critics have argued that in areas where the US is not involved in armed conflict, it cannot lawfully resort to military force. [The US Congress authorized the use of military force after 9/11, which allowed the president to target those who “planned, authorised, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks” of 9/11—which interpreted to mean Al-Qaeda—but some have questioned whether drone strikes are justified under the post-9/11 authorization and therefore would require additional congressional authorization.] In less clear cases, such as undeclared combat zones (i.e. U.S. drone use in Pakistan, Yemen) the US is expected to work with the government of the country in which it operates drones abiding by a key exception to the Article 2(4) of the UN Charter prohibition on the use of force. The Pakistani government has, at times, reacted angrily to what they view as unilateral actions there, which is a significant lapse in meeting the requirement of the use of force being carried out with the consent of the ‘host’ state. Such long term damage to alliances and to U.S. national interest in this case is known as ‘blowback’ – incidents that arise in later years as a latent result of actions taken today. Whereas the CIA in the 1980’s was ‘secretly’ arming the mujihadeen fighters (led by Osama Bin Laden) against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan, these so-called freedom fighters were later responsible for the bombings of 9/11. Today, this ‘blowback’ could later appear in Northern Pakistan whose residents will internalise the distress and hatred that resulted from the hundreds of drone strikes that have taken place in their country over the last decade. As one anti-drone organizer in Yemen put it: “Many people are living in constant fear because they could be next, creating widespread and long-term psychological torture. Many young boys are afraid to gather and children stop going to school and families stop gathering.” (Lazare, 2014). Similar cases have been seen even where military force was not used. In September 2012, a U.S.-made Predator surveillance drone— monitoring the PKK along the borders between Turkey and Iraq— was shot down by PKK Kurdish guerillas, shattering on the mountainous terrain near the Iraq-Turkey border (the PKK has been fighting for independence from Turkey state since 1984). For Kurdish guerrillas hiding nearby, it was an unexpected gift from the propaganda gods, whom soon after posted a YouTube video of the capturing of this charred wreckage. In yet another case, a dispute over the legality of ‘routine patrols’ recently occurred between Japan and China. Japan scrambled fighter jets near Chinese territory after what they suspected to be a Chinese drone flown near a small island chain (Senaku Islands— in Chinese parlance, Diaoyutai Islands)



controlled by Tokyo that is at the center of a bitter territorial dispute with China. The Chinese government, claiming 'routine' Chinese patrols of the islands are in line with international law and practice, warned Japan that any attempts to shoot down its unmanned drones over disputed islands in the East China Sea would be considered as an act of war and will invite retaliation.

How lethal are UAVs? Across Pakistan, Yemen and Somalia, the Obama administration has launched more than 390 drone strikes killing more than 2,400 people, at least 273 of them reportedly civilians (Serle, 2014). This does little to paint a picture of deadliness. Moreover, the latest research has shown the weapon systems on board these drones are getting even smaller and more precise in nature. For example, the previously criticised Hellfire missiles are being replaced by smaller Griffin or Spike missiles with the new Reapers typically carrying 6 Griffins as opposed to the 2 larger Hellfires originally carried. There are limitations to its use, however. If the Obama administration were to intervene in the current Iraq crisis, the use of drones has been ruled out. That is because the primary benefit of using drones is the ability to make precision attacks and carry out targeted assassinations. An aerial assault in Iraq would be much larger in scale, covering huge swaths of territory including the destructions of buildings and bridges. However, with drones becoming increasingly deadly— and able to carry a larger load of weapons— its abilities on the battlefield terrain could translate to a dramatic expansion in its use for much wider conflicts.

Drone use has not been limited to military use. Civilian intelligence agencies and surveillance military drone manufacturers are looking for ways to use drones for domestic surveillance, with the US Justice Department disclosing recently that two domestic law-enforcement agencies (the NYPD has been reported to soon use drones) use unmanned aircraft systems. The Obama administration has been defending its surveillance tactics since The Washington Post reported, after a review of secret documents provided by former NSA systems analyst Edward Snowden, suggested that the National Security Agency has been extensively involved in the US government's targeted killing program. The report made claim that although the US government had been collaborating closely with the CIA in the use of drones against terrorists abroad they inevitably gather some data on Americans. If this trend continues, drones will undoubtedly accelerate the dramatic expansion of the 'surveillance state', and bring to the forefront an important debate on the protections of privacy laws and civil liberties.

This is a critical time for the Obama administration to initiate conversation that can lead to an international doctrine regarding the use of drones and related technologies. These advanced weapons have become a critical piece of this administration's foreign policy. Their accuracy, relative ease-of-use, reduced (human) risk, and comes at a considerable discount in light of recent military budget cuts. Similar to the nuclear arms race, however much more expeditiously, there has been a global proliferation of the drone. A step in the direction of regulation has been taken by the UN body with the creation of a UN special rapporteur to new NGO campaigns which has called for a preemptive ban on 'next generation' drones currently under development.

Although the US government has started to make efforts to establish policies and to engage in the growing debate over drone usage, more needs to be done. Most likely, it will require a focused effort on the part of the president. The ability to set the terms of the debate, and to create the necessary international attention and cooperation, would be enhanced if presented in a major presidential speech. This would initiate an important debate in Congress, and of course, internationally. There are several important issues that President Obama needs to address: The first is that of revising the current international law to cover the development and use—war acts vs. covert acts— of these new technologies (i.e. The UN Charter and "use of force"). The



second involves establishing clear delineations between the military vs. civilian intelligence agency use of such technologies, and the proper role for Congress and the President regarding drone use. The third issue, and perhaps the most important, involves the coordination of 'development and use' doctrines by the United States and its allies. By taking the initiative now, Obama has the opportunity to provide the momentum necessary to motivate other leaders and nations to embark on a mission to fill today's gaps in the discourse and guide tomorrow's policy.

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Book Review

Warren Chin. *Britain and the War on Terror: Policy, Strategy and Operations*. Dorchester: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2013. pp.250. £65.00. ISBN: 978-0-7546-9528-8

Reviewed by Sarah V. Marsden



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Whilst it may feel that the ‘war on terror’ has been covered exhaustively (sometimes exhaustingly) in the literature, a comprehensive overview of the conflict from the British perspective has so far been missing. In *Britain and the War on Terror*, Warren Chin addresses this gap, offering a carefully focused account of the UK’s strategy in the conflict. Exploring Britain’s role from 2001-2010, Chin’s evaluation of the UK’s conduct since 9/11 is far from complementary, concluding that: “the British war on terror represented a classic example of how not to plan and conduct a war.” (p.214).

In reaching his damning conclusion, Chin first looks at Britain’s strategic framework (chapter 2), before reviewing Al Qaeda’s ideology, structure and strategy (chapter 3). In the fourth chapter the question of whether the overblown nature of the threat from Iraq was a result of “mendacity on a grand scale or simply incompetence” (p.13) is explored. The UK’s occupation of postwar Iraq is the subject of chapter 5, linking the failure of grand strategy to the failure of Britain’s military to satisfactorily consolidate their position on the ground. The war in Afghanistan is the subject of chapter 6, before turning to the home front in chapter 7, arguing that although the Labour government prioritized counterterrorism in the UK, an essentially flawed strategy saw it fail.

Given the huge scope of the conflict, Chin does well to focus his account on a number of core questions relating to: the political goals of the war; the extent to which there was an adequate understanding of Al Qaeda; how well means were balanced with ends, and costs against benefits; and whether the government concentrated its resources on the right centre of gravity, something Chin believes to be the ‘battle for hearts and minds of the people’.

Although recognising the challenges facing the UK as a junior partner in the coalition, Chin argues that the failures of the war were crucially informed by a failure of grand strategy. Notably, the unrealistic scope of the conflict (to rid the world of terrorism), the insufficient means at the disposal of those charged with prosecuting the war, and an overreliance on technology. A failure to fully consider the consequences of the UK’s role in the war, both at home and abroad, is also cited as a significant strategic failure. Describing a somewhat dysfunctional political decision making apparatus, comprising a small coterie of advisors to then Prime Minister Tony Blair, Chin suggests that the failure to properly interrogate the assumptions on which UK strategy was developed informed its subsequent failure. Arguing that, because of a general suspicion about the role of religion in politics, and a belief that Al Qaeda was an essentially irrational adversary, there was a failure to perceive the explicitly political goals Al Qaeda articulated.

Chin offers an important account of some of the political, structural and military issues that informed the problems the UK had in prosecuting the war on terror. However, in interrogating the Labour government’s interpretation of the threat from Al Qaeda, Chin is occasionally in danger of taking propagandistic rhetoric as reflecting strategic thinking. Similarly, whilst the account of the UK government’s failures is cogent and



clearly evidenced, one of the challenges it faces is occasionally relying too heavily on the wisdom of hindsight. Both the military and the government were operating with far from perfect information. Although Chin acknowledges this, the gap between what we know now, and the significant limitations on both intelligence and knowledge about many of the key actors in the conflict bears emphasising. The book pulls out some of the reasons why this imperfect knowledge led to what he describes as a strategic failure, and it is at the intersection of strategy and some of the underlying ideological and perceptual factors that informed how the conflict developed that some of the book's most profound insights lie.

Britain and the War on Terror goes some way to demonstrating how what might best be described as latent structures informed how the war was prosecuted. Notably, the sometimes biased way religion, and in particular Islam, was perceived, along with an a priori commitment to a specific doctrine (in this case the 'doctrine of the international community', which came to be known as 'Blair's doctrine'), and an almost willful overestimation of Iraqi state capacity. Moreover, the way the Blair government made decisions – the so-called 'kitchen cabinet' – created a situation where events were more easily interpreted in a way consonant with the perceptions of policymakers than their reality. In the context of the very real limits on intelligence and knowledge about the threat that, first Al Qaeda, and then Iraq posed, the result was both flawed policy, and an even more challenging operating environment for British forces in Iraq and Afghanistan than might otherwise have been the case. In Iraq, incomplete and sometimes inaccurate information about the situation on the ground hindered planning, making it more likely that broader structural biases might influence the prosecution of the war and the subsequent occupation. For example, the initial belief that UK experience of counterinsurgency equipped them better than US forces to successfully occupy areas of the country. Reinforced by the uneventful period UK forces spent in their initial 'occupational zone', when the first British units were dispatched to the 'Sunni Triangle', the realization that it was largely the context rather than the expertise of the British military that determined levels of violence, appears to describe a striking example of the fundamental attribution error. That is, the tendency to attribute internal characteristics to explain events, rather than external ones.

A further structural bias important in explaining the challenges facing the British campaign in Iraq was the frame by which the goals of the conflict were understood. Despite the wide-ranging nature of the conflict, the 'war on terror' was an explicitly military construct. It is perhaps not surprising therefore, that Chin's account of the UK's failure to understand the political, social and cultural circumstances in Iraq, was to some extent informed by the primarily military framework by which the conflict was interpreted. Compounded by the hurried timetable for the invasion, Chin describes inadequate liaison between departments, and failure to organise and instigate a satisfactory post-conflict plan. As Chin says: "In the run-up to the war, the intelligence also failed to inform any long-term analysis of the political dimension in Iraq. Instead it focused on generating the information needed to fight the military campaign ... and searching for weapons of mass destruction." (p.129).

The book is at its best when it weaves the theory of insurgency, war and conflict with the record of the UK's involvement. If there is a weakness, it is a heavy reliance on secondary literature which at times equates to a discussion of the received wisdom on particular issues. For example, when describing the challenges facing the Prevent strategy in the UK, although Chin offers a solid review of some of the issues, it provides little new to our understanding of how and why individuals have been influenced by the wider 'war on terror'. Nevertheless, the book offers an important and rigorous account of the UK's strategic approach to the conflict.



If there is a lesson to be drawn from *Britain and the War on Terror* it is that, despite the fact that wars must be waged on the basis of incomplete information, the organisational, cultural and ideological factors that may influence decision making demand challenge and scrutiny. It is for this reason that Chin's book will make valuable reading both for academics and students interested in the UK's approach to the conflict, and for policymakers, who will see many of the pitfalls of failing to properly construct, operationalise and support appropriate strategy writ large on its pages.

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